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Abstract 
NASA is working to increase the likelihood of human health and performance success during exploration 
missions as well as to maintain the subsequent long-term health of the crew. To manage the risks in achieving these 
goals, a system modelled after a Continuous Risk Management framework is in place. “Human System Risks” 
(Risks) have been identified, and approximately 30 are being actively addressed by NASA’s Human Research 
Program (HRP). Research plans for each of HRP’s Risks have been developed and are being executed. Inter-
disciplinary ties between the research efforts supporting each Risk have been identified; however, efforts to identify 
and benefit from these connections have been mostly ad hoc. There is growing recognition that solutions developed 
to address the full set of Risks covering medical, physiological, behavioural, vehicle, and organizational aspects of 
exploration missions must be integrated across Risks and disciplines. This paper discusses how a framework of 
factors influencing human health and performance in space is being applied as the backbone for bringing together 
sometimes disparate information relevant to the individual Risks. The resulting interrelated information enables 
identification and visualization of connections between Risks and research efforts in a systematic and standardized 
manner. This paper also discusses the applications of the visualizations and insights into research planning, 
solicitation, and decision-making processes. 
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Acronyms/Abbreviations 
CFM Contributing Factor Map 
CRM  Continuous Risk Management 
ExMC Exploration Medical Capabilities Element 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
HHC Human Health and Countermeasures Element 
HRP Human Research Program 
HRR Human Research Roadmap 
HSRB Human System Risk Board 
OIG Office of the Inspector General 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
 
1. Background 
 
1.1 Context 
NASA is committed to mitigating the in-mission and 
long-term health and performance risks of astronauts to 
enable safe, reliable, and productive space exploration 
missions. The NASA Human System Risk Board 
(HSRB) provides the forum for a process that manages 
the overall mitigation strategies for these human system 
risks (called “Risks” in this community) based on the 
Continuous Risk Management (CRM) framework and is 
overseen by Risk stakeholders within the agency from 
medical, operations, and research areas. The HSRB 
maintains an official record for each Risk’s relevant 
evidence base, the mission-specific Risk ratings and 
their drivers, contributing factors, available 
countermeasures, metrics, and notable deliverables.  
Within the set of Risks managed by the HSRB, 
many have been identified as requiring research as a 
significant part of their mitigation and have been 
assigned to the Human Research Program (HRP) to 
conduct necessary work. At this time, the HRP is 
implementing activities for characterizing and providing 
countermeasures and technologies to address 32 Risks 
in its research portfolio. Each of these Risks has a 
research plan that outlines the knowledge gaps that 
specific tasks are aimed to support as well as the 
schedule for their execution. Shared gaps and tasks 
between the Risks are noted in these research plans and 
are documented in the Human Research Roadmap 
(HRR) [1].  The HRR also provides general descriptions 
and context for the Risks.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160010575 2019-08-29T16:46:31+00:00Z
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Common information across the Risks is reflected in 
the HSRB Risk records and acknowledged in the HRP 
research plans. However, a systematic approach to 
better understand the linkages across Risks to form a 
basis for better integration of work and resources has 
not been followed. This paper outlines an approach to 
integrating Risk research and mitigation strategies.  
 
1.2 Motivation 
Recent reports from groups that reviewed aspects of 
NASA’s plans for reducing crew health and 
performance risks provide two examples of external 
motivation. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
reported in 2015 the following (emphasis added) [2]: 
 
“NASA’s management of crew health risks could benefit 
from increased efforts to integrate expertise from all 
related disciplines. While many life science specialists 
attempt to utilize the range of available expertise both 
inside and outside the Agency, NASA lacks a clear path 
for maximizing expertise and data at both the 
organizational and Agency level. For example, NASA 
has no formalized requirements for integrating human 
health and research among life sciences subject matter 
experts nor does it maintain a centralized point of 
coordination to identify key integration points for 
human health… The lack of a coordinated, integrated, 
and strategic approach may result in more time 
consuming and costly efforts to develop 
countermeasures to the numerous human health and 
performance risks associated with deep space 
missions.” 
 
Similarly, the Health and Medicine Division of the 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine reviewed Evidence Reports that are produced 
to capture the state of knowledge of the crew health and 
performance risks. The 2014 report states (emphasis 
added) [3]: 
 
“The reports… struggle with establishing the 
connections and interactions among risks that are 
related, but a bit more tangential (e.g., altered immune 
response and inadequate nutrition).” 
  
There is growing recognition within the crew health 
and performance community that developing solutions 
to the challenges posed by human spaceflight 
exploration missions requires crossing discipline 
boundaries. The HSRB has recently expressed a desire 
to better integrate the management of the Risks. HRP is 
recognizing the need to leverage connections to better 
identify and manage work to more efficiently use 
constrained research resources across disciplines and 
support innovative solution development.  
In any system development process, interfaces, 
whether they are conceptual, technical, or managerial, 
are where many challenges appear. The HRP does not 
currently have a systematic way to identify and manage 
interfaces and, consequently, has less ability to ensure 
that the most impactful work across disciplines will be 
addressed. 
In spaceflight systems engineering, discipline and 
subsystem (e.g., structures, avionics, power, and 
propulsion) scopes are well defined in a common 
conceptual model. This enables the management of 
interfaces throughout the development process, which 
supports the development of an integrated system. The 
work discussed in this paper is one approach to 
addressing this need and can be an early step to improve 
the scope and interface definitions of the Risks to 
promote integrated system solution development. 
 
1.3 Purpose and Scope 
The specific purpose of this initial exercise was to 
demonstrate techniques to systematically identify, 
organize, and manage interfaces among Risks. The 
scope was intentionally kept limited for this initial effort 
to determine if future work would be valuable. Input 
data was limited to existing information, favouring rapid 
proof-of-concept ideas and results over a more involved 
project scope and timeline. With this philosophy in 
mind, existing HSRB Risk records were used as the 
source of information to characterize each Risk’s 
contributing factors, mitigations, and metrics; and the 
HRR for a description of the scope of research work for 
the Risk. Because the baselined Risk records available 
at that time were created by different experts and were 
the first versions created as the risk process was being 
established, the contents in each were at varying levels 
of completeness. An analysis of the completeness of the 
information available in this exercise was not included; 
however, observations to support any future systematic 
completeness analysis were noted. 
 
2. Approach  
Four steps to accomplish its demonstration of 
techniques were defined: 
1) Normalize Risk record content using a common 
framework of terminology. 
This step allowed content in the Risk records 
provided by experts from different disciplines to be 
captured in the same conceptual model. The outcome 
provided the combined data set crossing all available 
Risk records. 
2) Identify Risk interfaces. 
In this step, the team defined types of interfaces of 
interest and then applied the combined data from the 
Risk records to identify related Risks. 
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3) Compare to planned research. 
Next, a first-pass evaluation of the integration status 
of Risks that were identified as related in Step 2 was 
performed. HRP’s HRR shows the research plans for 
each of its Risks, and research activities, called “Tasks”, 
are in place to accomplish those plans. Tasks can be 
linked to more than one Risk, allowing discipline 
experts focused on a particular Task to indicate when a 
Task’s work also supports other Risks. The 
determination of these links has previously been made 
in an ad hoc manner, but provided the team with one 
indication of the current state of awareness of 
conceptual interfaces. The team compared which Risks 
shared Tasks in the HRR to the set of relationships 
identified in Step 2 to identify potential collaboration 
areas. 
4) Visualize options for collaborations and their status. 
Finally, visualizations were created to support 
communication of the integration options and their 
status. These visualizations created the potential for 
tracking progress of integration in the future. 
 
3. Methods 
This section describes the activities undertaken for 
each of the four steps outlined in the approach. 
 
3.1 Normalize Risk record content using a common 
framework of terminology 
Because Risk record content was created using 
inputs from different subject matter experts with 
backgrounds crossing various disciplines, terminology 
often differed between records, even when similar 
topics were being addressed. To translate the content of 
the Risk records to the same conceptual model, a 
common language was needed. An existing taxonomy 
of terminology was used as this common language [4]. 
A visual representation of the taxonomy, called the 
Contributing Factor Map (CFM), is shown in Figure 1. 
The white boxes shown on the CFM represent factors 
influencing human health and performance in 
spaceflight. The team viewed the factors in the CFM as 
system variables whose states can contribute to mission 
success or failure. The states of some factors are 
considered alterable through the implementation of risk 
mitigations.    
An example of information obtained from a Risk 
record is shown in Table 1. The left column shows the 
type of information obtained from the record, the 
middle column shows examples of information 
available for one Risk (the “Renal Risk”), and the third 
column shows the CFM factors into which the record’s 
information was “binned” or coded to relate the Risk-
specific terms to the common conceptual framework of 
the CFM.  
Each of the 32 Risk records were manually read and 
the terms from each record to the CFM factor bins were 
coded. Conventions were developed for the coding 
activity, and cases in which coding was performed 
independently, results were compared to ensure 
consistency across the set of records. A single reader 
evaluated the entire set of record coding results to 
additionally ensure consistency. Once this step was 
complete, a data set existed in which each Risk had 
factors from the CFM identified as its contributing 
factors, mitigations, and metrics. 
 
Table 1. Example Binning of Risk Record Information 
with CFM Factors 
Information 
in Risk 
Record 
Example from 
Renal Stone Risk 
Record 
CFM Factor 
Bins 
Hazards and 
factors 
contributing 
to the Risk 
Primary hazard: 
microgravity (excess 
calcium excretion, 
low urine volume, 
urinary super-
saturation) 
 Acceleration or 
Gravity 
 Distance From 
Earth 
 Food System 
 Genitourinary 
Function 
 Mission 
Duration 
 CO2 
Secondary hazards: 
closed 
environment – 
(limited H20 
resource), distance 
from Earth 
Contributing factors: 
Increased urinary 
calcium excretion, 
decreased urine 
volume, increased 
urinary super-
saturation, dietary 
factors, mission 
duration, mission 
resources, 
hypercapnia 
Mitigations 
including 
available 
counter-
measures 
Preventative: 
screening, crew 
education, diet, 
potassium 
citrate/bisphosphona
tes 
 Ground Medical 
Care 
 Crew Selection 
 Food System 
 In-Flight 
Medications 
 Mission 
Scenarios 
Treatment – return 
to Earth 
Metrics to 
assess Risk 
status 
progress 
Renal stone 
occurrences 
 Genitourinary 
(Systemic 
Clinical 
Outcome) 
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TASK PERFORMANCE TYPES
MISSION PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCE LONG-TERM HEALTH CONSEQUENCEMISSION HEALTH CONSEQUENCE
Vehicle Architecture
Arrangement 
of Functional 
Areas
Access to 
Work Items
Translation Paths, 
Location Aids
Hatch 
Availability 
& Design
Window 
Availability 
& Design
Safety 
Accommo-
dations
Anthropometric 
Accommo-
dations
Organizational Support
Warning 
Capabilities
Safety 
Culture
Ground 
Medical Care
Ground 
Physiological
Care
Ground 
Behavioral 
Health Care
Ground Control 
& Crew 
Relationship
Performance 
Culture
Crew 
Selection
Level of 
Crew 
Autonomy
Design 
Processes
Operational 
Logistics
Ground 
Communications 
Availability & Ease
Vehicle Physical Environment
Noise Vibration
Ambient
Lighting
Temper-
ature
Humidity
Air 
Flow
CO2
Odor
Atmospheric 
Particulates
Acceleration
or Gravity
Oxygen
Toxic 
Substances
Radiation 
Exposure 
Atmospheric 
Pressure
Quality of Procedures
Availability of 
Procedures
Organization of 
Procedural Inputs & 
Info Availability
Familiarity of 
Response Patterns 
& Standardization
Clarity, Ease of Use, 
Comprehensibility of 
Procedures
Task Planning and 
Scheduling
Task 
Timeline
Task 
Deﬁnition
Task 
Design
Task 
Allocation
Work Load
Cognitive 
Work Load
Physical 
Work Load
Shift Scheduling
Work Shifts 
& Breaks
Consecutive 
Days On & Off
Sleep 
Shifting
Time Context
Available 
Time
Beginning, 
Middle or 
End of Shift
Contributing Factor Map
Factors Inﬂuencing Human Health and Performance in Spaceﬂight and Post-Flight
Habitability
Isolation &
Conﬁnement
Private Space & 
Personal Items
Sensory 
Stimulation
Recreation or 
Personal Activity 
Options
In-ﬂight
Exercise 
Countermeasures
In-ﬂight 
Medical 
System
In-ﬂight 
Medications
Inventory 
Management 
Capability
Habitable 
Volume
Cleanliness of 
Environment
Hygiene 
Support
Food 
System
Micro-
organism 
Virulence
In-ﬂight 
Behavioral Health 
Support
In-ﬂight Non-Exercise 
Physiological 
Countermeasures
User Interfaces
Mobility Aids & Restraints 
Availability & Design
Information 
Displays or 
Decision Aids
Identiﬁability Standardization
Situation-
Speciﬁc 
Lighting
Control 
Panels or
Input Devices
Hardware Tool 
Availability & Design
Hardware 
Ease of Use
Information 
Management Support
Software 
Ease of Use
Human & Vehicle 
Automation 
Integration
Human & 
Robotics 
Integration
Caution & 
Warning 
Functionality
Orientation of 
User Interfaces
Range of Motion 
Accommodations
Reach Envelope 
Accommodations
Body Surface Area, 
Volume, & Mass Props 
Accommodations
Suit Efﬁciency 
Design Parameters
Strength 
Accommodations
Physiological Adaptations
Cardiovascular or 
Cardiopulmonary 
Function
Circadian 
Rhythm 
Function
Endocrine 
System 
Function
Sleep 
Quantity 
& Quality
Fluid Shift
Proprioceptive 
& Postural 
Function
Sensorimotor 
& Vestibular 
Function
Bone 
Strength
IVD 
Morphology
Nutritional 
Status
Muscle 
Performance
Visual 
Perception
Function
Auditory 
Perception 
Function
Immune 
System 
Function
Genitourinary 
Function
Digestive 
Function
Nervous 
System 
Function
Cellular 
Function
Aerobic 
Performance
Cognitive Adaptations
Memory or 
Knowledge
Attention or 
Alertness
Situational 
Awareness
Training Quality
Applicability 
of Training
Recency 
of Training
Crewmembers 
Training 
Together
Level of 
Training
Applicable 
Operational 
Experience
Language or 
Cultural Barriers 
to Training
Crew Collaboration Quality
CooperationCoordination
Communication 
within the Team 
Team 
Psychosocial 
Adaptation 
Psychological Conditions
Inﬂuence of 
Family, 
Friends & 
Society
Stress
Level of 
Trust in 
System
Level of 
Fear or 
Anxiety
Feelings of 
Accomplishment 
or Frustration
Level of 
Excitement 
or Boredom
Morale
Task Familiarity
Context or 
Setting as 
Expected
Novelty of 
Task
Existing Physical 
Conditions
Age Sex Genetics
Pre-existing 
Medical 
Condition
Lifestyle 
Pre-
disposition
Factor Domain 
Color Key:
Mission Planning
Distance 
from Earth
Mission 
Duration
Destination 
Environ-
ment
Mission 
Scenarios
Orbits & 
Trajectories
12/15/15
Operations
Vehicle 
Design
Human
Execution
Adapted from Mindock, J. and Klaus, D. “Contributing Factor Map: A Taxonomy of Influences on Human Performance and Health in Space.” IEEE Transactions on Human-Machine Systems, Vol. 44, No. 5, October 2014. 
Task Performance Outcomes
Clinical Health Outcomes
Physiological Performance Outcomes
Behavioral Health Outcomes
Injuries
Head, Mouth, 
Dental, Eye, 
Ear
Neck, 
Airway
Chest, 
Upper 
Back
Abdomen, 
Lower 
Back 
Shoulder, 
Arm, 
Elbow
Wrist, 
Hand, 
Finger
Hip, 
Leg, 
Knee
Ankle, 
Foot, 
Toes
Mission Outcomes
C=4
Loss of Mission
C=3
Loss of Major 
Objectives
C=2
Impacts 
Resources
C=1
No Additional 
Resources
C=4
Loss of Crew
C=3
Signiﬁcant 
Injury or Illness
C=2
Minor Injury or 
Illness
C=1
Temporary 
Discomfort
C=4
Major Impact 
Quality of Life
C=3
Moderate Impact 
Quality of Life
C=2
Negligible Impact 
Quality of Life
C=1
No Impact 
Quality of Life
PlanningInterpretationObservation
HSRB Hazard:
Above factors and outcomes for each individual can inﬂuence overall mission outcomes
Systemic Clinical Outcomes
Blood, Blood-
Forming 
Organs, Immune
Endocrine, 
Nutritional, 
Metabolic
Nervous Circulatory Respiratory
Digestive
Skin and 
Subcutaneous 
Tissue
Musculoskeletal 
and Connective 
Tissue
Genitourinary
Speciﬁc Clinical Outcomes
Burns, 
Corrosion
Poison, 
Toxin
Malignancy,
Tumor
Altitude or 
Decompression 
Sickness
Space 
Motion 
Sickness
Acute 
Radiation 
Syndrome
Complications 
of Medical or 
Surgical Care
WORK IN  PROGRESS
 
Figure 1. Contributing Factor Map version applied for the work discussed in this paper. The white boxes shown on 
the CFM represent factors influencing human health and performance in spaceflight. 
 
3.2 Identify Risk interfaces 
Six interface types were defined for this exercise: 
1. Risks whose scope of work addresses 
contributing factors of other Risks 
2. Risks whose scope of work addresses 
mitigations of other Risks 
3. Risks whose scope of work addresses metrics 
of other Risks 
4. Risks that share common contributing factors 
5. Risks that share common mitigation factors 
6. Risks that share common metrics 
 
Creation of the content for interface types 1-3 
required defining the scope of work for each Risk in 
terms of the CFM factors. The Risk descriptions from 
the Risk records and research summaries from the 
HRR were used to identify factors that represented 
each Risk’s scope of work. A simple example is the 
scope defined for the Renal Risk. The scope was 
represented by two factors in Figure 1: the factor 
“Genitourinary Function”, shown in the Physiological 
Performance Outcomes area of the CFM, and the 
“Genitourinary Systemic Clinical Outcome” factor, 
shown in the Clinical Health Outcomes area of the 
chart.  
At this point, each Risk had factors in the CFM 
identified as its contributing factors, mitigations, 
metrics, and scope of work. The data set was then 
imported into a network visualization tool called 
Gephi [5]. The tool allowed organization of the data 
set and creation of initial visualizations of the 
interfaces across Risks.  
An example interface identification network is 
shown in Figure 2. The Risks are shown as the nodes 
in the network, and a line, or “edge” in network 
terminology, is drawn between Risks when an 
interface exists. This example includes the first three 
types of interfaces, and the line convention is: 
1. Risk at the head of the arrow has contributing 
factor(s) in the scope of the Risk at the arrow 
start. 
2. Risk at the head of the arrow has mitigation(s) 
in the scope of the Risk at the arrow start. 
3. Risk at the head of the arrow has metric(s) in 
the scope of the Risk at the arrow start.  
In short, work taking place in a Risk at an arrow start 
should influence the state of a Risk at the arrow head.  
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Fig. 2. Interfaces between the Renal Risk and other 
Risks. Nodes represent Risks, and edges indicate 
interfaces between Risks. Numbers 1, 2, and 3 
indicate the interface type. Edge colors indicate 
whether the risks share tasks in the HRR (green: 
shared tasks; red: no shared tasks; blue: N/A – one of 
the Risks associated with the edge is not an HRP 
Risk). See Appendix A for the full names of the 
Risks. 
3.3 Compare to planned research  
Steps 1 and 2 provide one indication of interfaces 
among Risks based on inputs captured in the HSRB 
Risk records. Next, an indication of the status of 
interfaces was developed. The simplest starting point 
for this limited scope exercise was to capture whether 
related Risks shared any Tasks in their research plans, 
as indicated by shared Tasks in the HRR. 
Coloured interface lines were used as indication 
of Risks sharing Tasks in the network representation, 
as show in Figure 2. A green line indicates that the 
connected Risks share Tasks in the HRR, while a red 
line indicates that the Risks do not share any Tasks in 
the HRR. Because some HSRB Risks do not require 
research, they are not part of HRP’s research plan as 
shown in the HRR.  Therefore, these connections are 
shown with a blue line to indicate that shared research 
is not applicable. 
 
Stability	
Medical	
Renal	
Fracture	
ExMC		
Element		
Risks:	
Work	taking	
place	in	a	Risk	
at	an	arrow	
start	influences	
the	state	of	a	
Risk	at	the	
arrow	head.	
Line	
Color	
Do	Risks	Share	Tasks	in	
HRR?	
%	in	
Category	
No	 44%	
Yes	 31%	
N/A	(not	HRP	Risks)	 25%	
 
Figure 3: Interfaces between all four of the ExMC Risks (nodes with same title as encompassing box) and related 
Risks (connected nodes). Edge numbers indicate the interface type (1, 2, or 3), and edge colors indicate whether the 
Risks share tasks in the HRR. The percentages shown in the legend indicate the proportions of the Risk interfaces 
associated with shared and unshared tasks, as well as the proportion of interfaces associated with non-HRP Risks. 
(See Appendix A for the full names of the Risks.) 
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3.4 Visualize options for collaborations and their 
status 
The Gephi program was used to produce 
additional views of the combined data set. For 
example, one of the six management groups, or 
Elements, within HRP, the Exploration Medical 
Capabilities (ExMC) Element, was responsible at the 
time of this exercise for four Risks with the short 
titles Medical, Stability, Renal, and Fracture. Figure 3 
shows these four Risks on the same presentation chart 
with statistics indicating the interface percentage 
according to task sharing status based on the HRR. 
This gives an Element-level overview of integration 
status with other Elements’ areas of research and 
provides a metric for tracking progress as future work 
becomes more integrated. 
Another example view is shown in Figure 4. This 
example focuses on interface Type 4, indicating 
HSRB Risks that share contributing factors. The 
focus of this example is ExMC’s Medical Risk (the 
central node), and other HSRB Risks are shown at the 
perimeter. A line is drawn if the outer HSRB Risk 
shares a contributing factor with the central Medical 
Risk, and the thickness of the line indicates the 
number of shared contributing factors. As in the 
previous figures, the colors of the lines in Figure 5 
indicate whether the Risks share Tasks in the research 
plan represented in the HRR. The colors of the nodes 
indicate the HRP Element that is responsible for the 
research supporting that Risk. This view provides 
useful insight into the associations between Risks, 
such as that between the Medical Risk and the 
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Risk. These two Risks 
appear to share many contributing factors but do not 
yet share research Tasks as indicated in the HRR. 
 
4. Outcomes  
Insights to inform Element planning can be 
gained from such an approach. For example, based on 
the visualizations provided in Figures 3 and 4, the 
ExMC Element is found to have a high potential for 
fruitful untapped collaborations with the Human 
Health Countermeasures (HHC) Element. The lower 
left box in Figure 3, focusing on the Medical Risk, 
shows that 5 of the 6 red edges are connected to Risks 
managed by the HHC Element. Figure 4 shows that 9 
of the 13 red edges are connected to HHC Risks. The 
connection between the Medical and EVA Risks is 
one prominent example, and in looking at the global 
data set, we can describe why collaborations may 
make sense. For example, Figure 3 indicates that 
interface type 2 exists, and the data set shows us that 
the EVA Risk relies on the medical system as a 
mitigation. Looking into interface type 3 reveals that 
a key metric of the EVA community is occurrence of 
injuries while in an EVA suit, which is in the scope of 
what medical system planning must accommodate. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Identification of HSRB Risks that share 
contributing factors with the Medical Risk, with 
edges colored according to whether the Risks share 
common tasks in the research plan and nodes colored 
according to HRP Element. See Appendix B for 
Element names. Line thickness indicates the number 
of common contributing factors. N/A: not an HRP 
Risk. 
 
In addition, Figure 4 indicates that the EVA and 
Medical Risks share multiple contributing factors. 
The global data set informs us that the factors 
Acceleration or Gravity, Destination Environment, 
Distance from Earth, Food System, Mission 
Scenarios, Nutritional Status, Pre-existing Medical 
Condition, and Radiation Exposure are in common.  
Common factors, such as Destination Environment 
and Mission Scenarios, indicate topics of potentially 
fruitful collaboration.  
This approach and its demonstration led HRP 
Program Management to ask whether similar ideas 
could be used to identify integration opportunities for 
research solicitation topics. Topic development in the 
past was previously performed by each Element more 
or less independently without significant cross-
Element coordination. More recently, however, the 
data set created as part of this work was used to 
generate collaboration ideas across Elements for the 
expected solicitation topics. These ideas were then 
discussed across Elements in an open, collegial 
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manner during Program meetings. In addition, 
meetings and communication took place outside of 
the Program forums to solidify topic collaborations. 
This led to a set of research solicitation topics that 
incorporated needs from multiple Risks and 
Elements. 
 
5. Future Work  
Future work includes the continued application of 
the global data set and network tools to identify 
integration ideas in support of research solicitation 
topic development. We are currently holding lessons-
learned activities to obtain feedback on the new topic 
development process within which the integration 
ideas were discussed. Feedback from across HRP will 
inform next steps on any supporting tool evolution. 
There are several areas of potential future efforts. 
First, assumptions made in developing the global data 
set could be reduced to increase confidence in results. 
The mapping between the terms in the HSRB Risk 
records and the CFM factors could be validated with 
experts, along with the assumptions of which factors 
from the CFM best represent the scope of work 
within a Risk. In addition, integration ideas identified 
during team discussions could be fed back into the 
global data set. 
A systematic evaluation of the interface ideas is 
also possible. The edge colors discussed here were a 
simple representation of whether Risks shared Tasks 
or whether Task sharing was not applicable (in the 
case of non-HRP Risks). However, it is recognized 
that the identification of shared Tasks does not 
necessarily indicate that adequate integration is in 
place. On the other hand, it is possible that no Tasks 
are shared because discussion of potential 
collaborations revealed that shared tasks do not make 
sense practically or scientifically. Therefore, it is 
possible to extend the link evaluations (in addition to 
N/A) to those shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Potential future link evaluation categories 
No new action New action 
Shared Tasks in place, 
and adequate integration 
is in place 
Shared Tasks in place, 
but additional 
integration is needed 
Shared Tasks not in 
place, but adequate 
integration is in place 
Shared Tasks not in 
place, and additional 
integration is needed 
 
 Tracking the progress of cross-Element 
integration is another potential application. As time 
progresses and research plans are updated, one would 
expect to see the edge colors change from red to 
green, or from categories requiring action to those not 
requiring action if classifications as in Table 2 were 
used. The statistics at both Element and Program 
levels summarizing these categorizations could be 
tracked to provide metrics revealing integration 
progress over time. 
In addition, as work within HRP moves toward 
reducing Risks by maturing system capabilities for 
exploration missions, increased efforts to integrate 
from organizational and technical perspectives will be 
required. Tools such as the one described here can 
provide support to the Elements in identifying and 
managing the various interfaces required to develop 
systems that will effectively address the wide range 
of crew needs and vehicle integration constraints. 
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper, we demonstrated approaches to 
systematically identify, organize, and manage 
interfaces among crew health and performance risks 
for which research-based mitigation work is managed 
by the HRP. Using a taxonomy for standardizing 
information in available Risk records from the HSRB 
and HRP and applying visualization techniques, we 
identified inherent linkages among Risks that 
otherwise could have been overlooked. A basis for 
discussion of whether further integration efforts are 
needed for known relationships was also provided.  
Various types of interfaces were  defined that could 
provide additional perspective for improving 
prioritization of risk mitigation work in an 
environment where resources are increasingly 
constrained.  The insights revealed by the use of these 
techniques not only support important decisions (e.g., 
on solicitation development, Element planning, and 
coordination) but also enhance communication of the 
integration of these Risks to various stakeholders and 
potential contributors to solutions that efficiently 
address these Risks. The systematic approach also 
facilitates the tracking of the status of these 
integration and collaboration opportunities, a 
capability that is still needed for the management of 
research work within the HRP and the general risk 
mitigation strategies within the HSRB. 
 
Appendix A. Risk Abbreviations Used in Figures 
Aerobic Risk of Reduced Physical Performance 
Capabilities due to Reduced Aerobic 
Capacity 
Arrhythmia Risk of Cardiac Rhythm Problems 
Back Pain Risk of Space Adaptation Back Pain 
BMed Risk of Adverse Cognitive or 
Behavioral Conditions and Psychiatric 
Disorders 
DCS Risk of Decompression Sickness 
Dust Risk of Adverse Health & Performance 
Effects of Celestial Dust Exposure 
Electric Shock Risk to Crew Health due to 
Electrical Shock 
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EVA Risk of Injury and Compromised 
Performance due to EVA Operations 
Food Risk of Performance Decrement and 
Crew Illness due to an Inadequate 
Food System 
Fracture Risk of Bone Fracture due to 
Spaceflight-induced Changes to Bone 
Hearing Loss Risk of Hearing Loss related to 
Spaceflight 
HSID Risk of Reduced Crew Performance 
and of Injury due to Inadequate 
Human-System Interaction Design 
Hypoxia Risk of Reduced Crew Health and 
Performance due to Hypobaric 
Hypoxia 
Immune Risk of Adverse Health Event due to 
Altered Immune Response 
IVD Concern of Intervertebral Disc Damage 
upon and immediately after Re-
exposure to Gravity 
Medical Risk of Adverse Health Outcomes & 
Decrements in Performance due to 
Inflight Medical Conditions 
Microhost Risk of Adverse Health Effects due to 
Host-Microorganism Interactions 
Muscle Risk of Impaired Performance due to 
Reduced Muscle Mass, Strength & 
Endurance 
Nutrition Risk of Inadequate Nutrition 
OI Risk of Orthostatic Intolerance during 
Re-exposure to Gravity 
OP Risk of Injury from Dynamic Loads 
Osteo Risk of Early Onset Osteoporosis due 
to Spaceflight 
PK/PD Concern of Clinically Relevant 
Unpredicted Effects of Medication 
Radiation Risk of Adverse Health Outcomes and 
Performance Decrements resulting 
from Space Radiation Exposure 
Renal Risk of Renal Stone Formation 
Sensorimotor Risk of Impaired Control of 
Spacecraft/Associated Systems and 
Decreased Mobility due to 
Vestibular/Sensorimotor Alterations 
Associated with Spaceflight 
Sleep Risk of Performance Decrements and 
Adverse Health Outcomes Resulting 
from Sleep Loss, Circadian 
Desynchronization, and Work 
Overload 
Stability Risk of Ineffective or Toxic 
Medications due to Long-Term Storage 
Sunlight Risk of Injury from Sunlight Exposure 
Team Risk of Performance and Behavioral 
Health Decrements due to Inadequate 
Cooperation, Coordination, 
Communication, and Psychosocial 
Adaptation within a Team 
Toxic Exposure Risk of Toxic Exposure 
Urinary Ret Risk of Urinary Retention 
VIIP Risk of Spaceflight-Induced 
Intracranial Hypertension/Vision 
Alterations 
 
Appendix B. HRP Element Names 
BHP Behavioral Health and Performance  
ExMC Exploration Medical Capability 
HHC Human Health and Countermeasures  
SHFH Space Human Factors and Habitability  
SR Space Radiation  
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